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Abstract
Background: Why do some people live for the present, whereas others save for the future? The evolutionary framework of
life history theory predicts that preference for delay of gratification should be influenced by social economic status (SES).
However, here we propose that the decision to choose alternatives in immediate and delayed gratification in poverty
environments may have a psychological dimension. Specifically, the perception of environmental poverty cues may induce
people alike to favor choices with short-term, likely smaller benefit than choices with long-term, greater benefit.
Methodology/Principal Findings: The present study was conducted to explore how poverty and affluence cues affected
individuals’ intertemporal choices. In our first two experiments, individuals exposed explicitly (Experiment 1) and implicitly
(Experiment 2) to poverty pictures (the poverty cue) were induced to prefer immediate gratification compared with those
exposed to affluence pictures (the affluence cue). Furthermore, by the manipulation of temporary perceptions of poverty
and affluence status using a lucky draw game; individuals in the poverty state were more impulsive in a manner, which
made them pursue immediate gratification in intertemporal choices (Experiment 3). Thus, poverty cues can lead to short-
term choices.
Conclusions/Significance: Decision makers chose more frequently the sooner-smaller reward over the later-larger reward as
they were exposed to the poverty cue. This indicates that it is that just the feeling of poverty influences intertemporal
choice – the actual reality of poverty (restricted resources, etc.) is not necessary to get the effect. Furthermore, our findings
emphasize that it is a change of the poverty-affluence status, not a trait change, can influence individual preference in
intertemporal choice.
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Introduction
The status of poverty and affluence determine many aspects of
our social life, from the social activities individuals engaged in [1]
to choice preference in social and economic behavior [2–3]. It has
been shown that ordinary people in poverty countries tend to save
less for retirement, eat less healthy food, exercise less regularly
than those in wealthy countries [4]. Rational economic theories
suggest that ordinary people in the poverty countries have limited
resources yet more pressing short-term needs, which prevent them
from making long-term investments. Recently, Griskevicius, et al.
(2011) [5] showed that mortality cues led individuals who grew up
relatively poor to value the present and led individuals who grew
up relatively wealthy to value the future. The reasons might be
that individuals who grew up relatively poor were associated with
fewer resources, greater exposure to threat, whereas individuals
who grew up relatively wealthy were associated with more
resources and are characterized by economic independence
[2,6–7]. In order to adapt to dangerous situations, individuals
who grew up relatively poor could need urgently social resources.
In addition, previous studies have suggested that subjective social
economic status (SES) could be a better predictor of health status
than the objective SES [8–9]. Disease consequences of feeling poor
are often rooted in the psychosocial consequences of being made
to feel poor by one’s surroundings. Thus, here we propose that the
decision to choose sooner-smaller rewards in poverty environment
may have a psychological dimension. Poor cues can make people
feel that they have fewer resources, greater exposure to threat.
Specifically, the perception of environmental poverty cues may
induce people alike to favor choices with short-term, likely smaller
benefit than choices with long-term, greater benefit.
Although no previous studies have directly tested this hypoth-
esis, existing evidence suggested that psychological factors indeed
often affected individuals’ intertemporal choices. For example, it
has been shown that many individuals chose alternatives with
immediate but smaller benefit over delayed but greater reward
because the long-term benefits were psychologically discounted
[10–11]. Further, immediate environmental cues also seem to play
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e33950an important role. For example, Zhong and DeVoe (2010) [12]
found that when participants were exposed to logos of fast food
restaurants, they showed more impatience and preferred imme-
diate gains over long-term benefits.
The present study was conducted to explore the impact of cues
of poverty on individuals’ intertemporal choices. In Experiment 1,
we first asked participants to decide initially whether they wished
to receive a smaller payment for participation right after the
experiment or a larger payment 3 days later. After this pre-test,
participants judged photographs in terms of the extent to which
they depicted poverty or affluence. After this priming task,
participants were asked to choose their preferred manner of
subject fee payment, exactly the same as the pre-test. The
difference between the post- and pre-test in choices would allow
for assessing the effect of poverty cue priming on participants’
intertemporal choices. Experiments 2 and 3 were identical to
Experiment 1 except for the following: in Experiment 2, instead of
the explicit picture judgment task used in Experiment 1, we asked
participants to count the number of people shown in the pictures,
which served as an implicit priming task; in Experiment 3,
participants engaged in a lucky draw game with another partner in
which they might draw a prize or nothing, creating an temporary
state of ‘‘poverty’’ or ‘‘affluence’’. Based on the poverty cue
hypothesis, we expected that participants would be more inclined
to choose the immediate but smaller payment over the delayed but
greater payment after being exposed to the ‘‘poverty’’ pictures
(resource-deprived environments) or in a state of temporally
‘‘poverty’’ induced by the lucky draw. In contrast, those
participants who were exposed to the ‘‘affluence’’ pictures or
drew prizes would be more inclined to choose the delayed
payment.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we tested whether explicit exposure to poverty
and affluence pictures can induce individuals’ different desires to
pursue immediate gratification.
Participants
Two groups of participants were recruited. The first group
consisted of 30 college students (M=20.67 years, SD=1.92 years,
age range=18–24 years; 15 females) from a Chinese university.
They rated photographs which be used in the priming task. An
additional group of 66 college students in Group 2 was recruited
from the same university (M=21.70 years, SD=1.91 years, age
range =18–25 years; 38 females) and they participated in the
priming task. All participants gave informed consent prior to their
participation in the study. Members of the first group of
participants were compensated with a small payment (5 RMB),
and members of the second group were compensated with
payments based on their performances.
Materials and Procedures
Group 1 rated 44 affluence pictures and 31 poverty pictures as
the pretest. In keeping with the previous literature [13], we used
a dimensional model for measuring pictures along 3 dimensions,
‘‘valence’’, ‘‘arousal’’ and ‘‘the degree of the poverty-affluence
state’’ and asked an independent sample of 30 participants to rate
the respective dimensions on a 9-point Likert scale. So we chose 25
poverty pictures and 25 affluence pictures, in which the disparity
of the poverty-affluence state was as large as possible(the poverty
picture: M=2.23, SD=1.219; the affluence picture: M=7.76,
SD=1.203; t(29)=26.96, p,001), and the difference of valence
and arousal between poverty pictures and affluence pictures was as
small as possible (the poverty picture (valence): M=4.72,
SD=1.946; the affluence picture (valence): M=5.97, SD=2.263;
t(29)=1.67, p=.172; the poverty picture (arousal): M=6.05,
SD=2.299; the affluence picture (arousal): M=4.99, SD=2.393);
t(29)=1.28, p=.233) (see Figure 1 for example).
We tested the prediction that individuals with priming of
poverty pictures were more likely to prefer immediate rewards,
whereas those with priming of affluence pictures were more likely
to choose delayed rewards. For this, participants were assigned
randomly to either the ‘‘poverty’’ cue or the ‘‘affluence’’ cue. First,
each participant indicated their preference, measured by a stan-
dard task, in which each participant made a series of binary
choices between ¥d today or ¥d9 in 3 day (e.g., ¥6 today or ¥9 in
3 day) [8] (pretest). For each trial, the immediate RMB amount
(¥d) was drawn randomly from a Gaussian distribution with mean
¥6 and standard deviation ¥3, clipped to give a minimum of ¥3
and a maximum of ¥9. The percent difference in renminbi yuan
(RMB) amounts between the two rewards ((¥d92¥d)/¥d) was
selected from the set {5%, 10%, 15%, 25%, 35%, 50%, 75%,
95%} [14]. Each participant performed 64 trials in a block.
Participants were instructed that they would receive one of their
choices (randomly selected from the set of all of their choices) at
the end of the experiment. Next, they were explicitly told that
because of this payment scheme, they should make each choice as
though it was the one they were actually going to receive. At the
end of the experiment, participants implemented a computer
lottery. The procedure could randomly extract a numeral between
1 and 64 in which the numeral indicated the specified trial that
determined how much payoff participants got and when
participants got their payoff. For example, if participant chose
immediate reward in the trial, the money was available at the end
of the experiment; if participant chose delayed reward in the trial,
the money was available 3 days later. Percentage of immediate
rewards (%) chosen in total trials was as the ratio of interest. The
higher the ratio of interest, the greater the value participants
assigned to immediate rewards. After the choice task, participants
in the ‘‘poverty’’ cue completed a task to indicate the extent to
which the people in the poverty pictures were poor on a nine-point
scale (1-very poor, 9-very affluent; the explicit poverty cue).
Participants in the ‘‘affluence’’ cue indicated the extent to which
the people in the affluence pictures were affluent on the same nine-
point scale (the explicit affluence cue). Then, all of the participants
performed another homogeneous intertemporal task (posttest).
Finally, they completed the PANAS as a mood measure.
Figure 1. The poverty picture and the affluence picture.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033950.g001
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Two-way ANOVA on the type of pictures (poverty pictures vs
affluence pictures) and the type of task (pretest task vs posttest task)
revealed that there was a significant interaction between the two
factors (F(1, 64)=11.05, p=.001). After performing simple effect
analysis, the following results were obtained: in the pretest task,
there was no significant difference between the preference
(Percentage of immediate rewards (%)) in the ‘‘poverty’’ cue
(M=53.98%, SD=18.48%) and the preference in the ‘‘affluence’’
cue (M=52.27%, SD=16.73%), t(64)=0.49, p=.625. This can be
regarded as the homogeneity of participants in the two cues. In the
posttest task, compared with participants in the ‘‘affluence’’ cue
(M=49.68%, SD=18.76%), participants in the ‘‘poverty’’ cue
preferred more instant gratification (M=58.33%, SD=18.93%),
t(64)=2.05, p=.044. For another simple effect analysis method,
participants with the poverty pictures priming preferred more
instant gratification in the posttest task (M=58.33%,
SD=18.93%) than in the pretest task (M=53.98%,
SD=18.48%), t(33)=23.18, p=.003. Although participants with
the affluence pictures priming preferred more delayed gratification
in the posttest task (M=49.68%, SD=18.76%) than in the pretest
task (M=52.27%, SD=16.73%), it was not significant,
t(31)=1.73, p=.093 (see Figure 2). Thus, the disparity of the
poverty and affluence cue induced individuals’ different desires to
pursue immediate gratification.
After the manipulation, participants completed the PANAS as
a mood measure. To evaluate whether these effects might have
been the result of changes in affective state of the participants, we
used mood measure as a covariate in the ANOVA and the result
showed that the interaction remained significant (F(1, 64)=9.46,
p=.003). Thus, our findings indicated that the observed effects
were not simply due to difference in affect. In addition, two
independent samples T tests were conducted using the Positive
Affect and Negative Affect subscales of the PANAS as dependent
measures. Results revealed no significant different between the two
groups in terms of positive affect (t(64)=0.14, p=.889) and
negative affect (t(64)=21.46, p=.150).
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we examined whether exposure to poverty
pictures and affluence pictures, even at an implicit level, can
automatically induce individuals’ different desires to immediate
gratification.
Participants
A total of 65 undergraduate students from a Chinese university
(M=21.72 years, SD=1.94 years, age range =18–24 years; 36
females) were assigned randomly to two conditions and the
payments of participants were identical to those given in
Experiment 1.
Materials and Procedure
The materials of Experiment 2 were identical to those used in
Experiment 1. Participants were first asked to complete an
intertemporal choice task (pretest). Then, participants in the
‘‘poverty’’ cue completed an ostensibly unrelated task to count the
number of people in the poverty pictures (the implicit poverty cue),
while the participants in the ‘‘affluence’’ cue were asked to count
the number of people in the affluence pictures (the implicit
affluence cue). After the priming task, all of the participants
performed another homogeneous intertemporal task (posttest).
Finally, they completed the PANAS as a mood measure.
Results
Similar to the result of Experiment 1, two-way ANOVA on the
type of pictures (poverty pictures vs affluence pictures) and the type
of task (pretest task vs posttest task) revealed that there was
a significant interaction between the two factors (F(1, 63)=8.38,
p=.005). After performing simple effect analysis, the following
results were obtained: In the pretest task, there was no significant
difference between the preference in the ‘‘poverty’’ cue
(M=50.94%, SD=21.32%) and the preference in the ‘‘affluence’’
cue (M=48.22%, SD=16.61%), t(63)=0.58, p=.567 (see
Figure 3). This can be regarded as the homogeneity of participants
in the two cues. In contrast, participants with the poverty pictures
priming preferred more immediate gratification in the posttest task
(M=58.20%, SD=24.45%) than those with the affluence pictures
priming (M=46.94%, SD=19.64%), t(63)=2.06, p=.044. For
another simple effect analysis method, participants with the
poverty pictures priming preferred more immediate gratification
in the posttest task (M=58.20%, SD=24.45%) than in the pretest
task (M=50.94%, SD=21.32%), t(30)=22.65, p=.013. Com-
pared with the pretest task (M=48.22%, SD=16.61%), partici-
pants with the affluence pictures priming tended to choose delayed
gratification in the posttest task (M=46.94%, SD=19.64%), but it
was not significant, t(33)=0.98, p=.332 (see Figure 3). Thus, at
the implicit level, the exposure to poverty and affluence pictures
induced individuals’ different preferences in intertemporal choice.
To determine whether the observed effects were the results of
changes in mood, we used mood measure as a covariate in the
ANOVA and the result showed that the interaction remained
significant (F(1, 63)=7.42, p=.008). In addition, two independent
samples T tests were conducted with the positive and negative
affect subscales of the PANAS. Results indicated that the two
experimental groups did not significantly differ in their levels of
Figure 2. Results from Experiment 1: mean percentage of
immediate reward as a function of the poverty and affluence
cues (pretest vs. posttest). Error bars indicate standard errors of the
mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033950.g002
Figure 3. Results from Experiment 2: mean percentage of
immediate reward as a function of poverty and affluence cues
(pretest vs. posttest). Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033950.g003
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(t(63)=0.46, p=.646).
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we examined other forms of the poverty and
affluence conditions. Here, we created explicit ‘‘poverty’’ and
‘‘affluence’’ status based on wealth in the context of an interactive
game. We predicted that the manipulation of the temporary
poverty and affluence status can induce individuals’ different
preferences for immediate gratification.
Materials and Participants
A total of 62 undergraduate students from a Chinese university
(M=21.62 years, SD=1.94 years, age range =18–25 years; 36
females) were recruited to participate in the study. They were
given payments for their participation.
Procedure
Each participant received ¥3 basic pay. Then, they indicated
their preference in an intertemporal task (pretest). After complet-
ing the task, we asked them to play a game [15], in which they
were to draw notes labeled ‘‘affluence’’ or ‘‘poverty.’’ The
‘‘affluence’’ (high-pay) participant received another ¥5 bonus to
the basic pay (the ‘‘affluence’’ state), whereas the ‘‘poverty’’ (low-
pay) participant received no bonus (the ‘‘poverty’’ state). They
knew that their counterparts received or did not receive the
monetary bonus through the lottery game. Then, all of the
participants performed another homogeneous intertemporal task
(posttest). Finally, they completed the PANAS as a mood measure.
Results
As expected, two-way ANOVA on the type of pictures (poverty
pictures vs affluence pictures) and the type of task (pretest task vs
posttest task) revealed that there was a significant interaction
between the two factors (F(1, 60)=13.03, p=.001). After
performing simple effect analysis, the following results were
obtained: In the pretest task, there was no significant difference
between the preference in the ‘‘poverty’’ state (M=53.97%,
SD=17.72%) and the preference the ‘‘affluence’’ state (M=52.
01%, SD=16.38%), t(60)=0.45, p=.655 (see Figure 4). This can
be regarded as the homogeneity of participants. However,
participants in the ‘‘poverty’’ state preferred more immediate
gratification in the posttest task (M=59.68%, SD=16.15%) than
in the ‘‘affluence’’ state (M=50.20%, SD=17.88%), t(60)=2.19,
p=.032. For another simple effect analysis method, Participants in
the ‘‘poverty’’ state preferred more immediate gratification in the
posttest task (M=59.68%, SD=16.15%) than in the pretest task
(M=53.97%, SD=17.72%), t(30)=23.91, p,001. Similarly,
although participants in the ‘‘affluence’’ state preferred delayed
gratification in the posttest task (M=50.20%, SD=17.88%)
relative to the pretest task (M=52. 01%, SD=16.38%), it was
not significant, t(30)=1.22, p=.232 (see Figure 4). Thus,
participants in the ‘‘poverty’’ state seemed impulsive in a manner
that could make them prefer to immediate gratification.
As in the previous studies, we examined whether effects of the
poverty and affluence status might be caused by changes in mood.
We used mood measure as a covariate in the ANOVA and the
results showed that the interaction remained significant (F(1,
60)=13.55, p=.001). In addition, two independent samples T
tests were conducted with the positive and negative affect subscales
of the PANAS. Results indicated that the two experimental groups
did not significantly differ in their levels of positive affect
(t(60)=0.96, p=.343) and negative affect (t(60)=0.92, p=.360).
Discussion
Recent studies suggested that the real world decisions (e.g.,
intertemporal choice) could be influenced by subtle context cues.
However, the consequences of the perception of environmental
poverty and affluence cues were not adequately understood until
now. Based on recent advancements in the behavioral priming
literatures, we conjectured that individuals in the poverty cues
would likely choose short-term but smaller benefits rather than
long-term but greater rewards. In the first two experiments,
explicit and implicit exposure to poverty pictures induced
individuals to prefer immediate gratification compared with those
exposed to affluence pictures. By manipulating the temporal
poverty and affluence state, Experiment 3 increased the concern
that individuals with perceptions priming of impoverished
environments (versus affluent environments) were more likely to
choose the immediate but small options. Through the PANAS, we
found that overall mood state was not affected by our manipula-
tions.
Why do individuals in poverty cues prefer immediate gratifica-
tion? Objectively, the poor are associated with fewer resources,
greater exposure to threat, and a reduced sense of personal control
[2], as opposed to the rich who are associated with more resources
and are characterized by economic independence and elevated
personal control [6–7]. In order to adapt to the dangerous
situations, the poor must need more social resources, such as
money [16–17]. Ultimately, it motivates actions designed to
reduce or eliminate the threat and to retain the valuable
relationship and the resource. Thus, one prediction from this
adaptive view of impulsiveness is that the poor may feel that their
poverty state in society prevents them from accessing to the same
opportunities as the rich and that the choosing of immediate
rewards, in part, derives from a desire to correct for the poverty
state [18].
Subjectively, the feeling of poverty may be the core of why the
poor prefer immediate gratification. Previous studies have
suggested that subjective SES could be a better predictor of
health status than the objective SES [8–9]. In addition, previous
studies have also suggested that disease consequences of feeling
poor were often rooted in the psychosocial consequences of being
made to feel poverty by the surroundings. As the results of the first
two experiments, the manipulation shifted the perception of the
participants regarding their relative poverty and affluence status.
Thus, both priming (Experiment 1 and Experiment 2) and
temporal (Experiment 3) poverty and affluence status may
produce the same results: Individuals in poverty state prefer
immediate gratification compared with those in affluence state.
This indicates that just the feeling of poverty influences
Figure 4. Results from Experiment 3: mean percentage of
immediate reward as a function of the manipulations of the
‘‘poverty’’ state and the ‘‘affluence’’ state (pretest vs. posttest).
Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033950.g004
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resources, etc.) is not necessary to get the effect.
Griskevicius, et al. (2011) [5] showed that, since different life
history strategies were shaped by individuals’ childhood environ-
ments, mortality cues led individuals who grew up in a relatively
resource-scarce environment to regard the present as important
and led individuals who grew up in a relatively resource-plentiful
environment to regard the future as important. Their finding
indicated that trait factors (e.g. individuals’ childhood environ-
ments) influenced economic decisions and risky behaviors.
However, many studies have found that social and economic
behavior could be influenced by context cues. For example, people
who cast their vote within a school were more likely to endorse
school funding initiatives on the ballet than others [19]. Similarly,
by manipulating participants’ temporary perceptions of their
social-class rank, lower-class individuals (compared with upper-
class individuals) made more accurate inferences about emotion
from static images of muscle movements in the eyes [20]. Our
results showed that temporary priming of poor cues could actually
influence individuals’ economic decisions by shifting people life
history strategies.
In contrast to the above hypothesis which describes preferences
for immediate versus delayed gratification as distinct life history
strategies, an equally plausible alternative is that loss/gain frames
may play a role in our results. Previous studies showed that loss/
gain frames affected risk perception [21], which resulted in choice
biases arising from an affect heuristic played by an emotional
system [22]. In present research, poor cues which were negative
cues were perceived as ‘‘loss’’ frame, while affluent cues which
were positive cues were perceived as ‘‘gain’’ frame. Delay exerted
its influence on choices via the perceived uncertainty associated
with waiting [23–24]. The reasons might be that individuals were
more sensitive to negative cues (‘‘loss’’ frame) [25–26]. For
example, poor cues made individuals more sensitive to their living
environments. In other words, poor cues made individuals feel that
they had fewer resources, greater exposure to threat. So they chose
instant gratification in order to adapt to the dangerous environ-
ments [5]. However, our data only demonstrated the idea that
environmental cues of poverty vs. affluence could influence
intertemporal choice, and it did not speak the process mechanism
for our effects. Future work is needed to study the hypothesized
process mechanism. Collectively, although previous research
showed that life history strategies were shaped and influenced by
trait factors (e.g., childhood socioeconomic status) [5], our findings
demonstrated that life history strategies were also affected by
context factors (e.g., temporary priming concepts of poor).
It is worth noting that while individuals in poverty cues
preferred immediate gratification, individuals in affluence cues did
not show a significant preference for delayed gratification.
Although previous studies showed that the affluence environments
could shift preferences toward delayed gratification [5], there are
some differences between those studies and our study. For
example, our experiments were the priming of temporal poverty
and affluence cues (states) (context factor), rather than the change
of really poverty and affluence environments (trait factor). From
the perspective of loss/gain frames, individuals are less sensitive to
positive cues (‘‘gain’’ frame) than to negative cues (‘‘loss’’
frame)[25–26]. Individuals with the affluent cues priming might
not choose delayed gratification, since they were not sensitive to
the affluent cues (positive cues).
In Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, we think that participants
were made to feel that they were in resource-rich vs. resource-
deprived environments, not to feel poor or affluent according to
the poverty cue hypothesis. This is in line with our results that
poverty cues made individuals instant gratification, and that, in
contrast, affluence cues did not make individuals delayed
gratification. Since individuals were more sensitive to negative
cues than to positive cues [25–26], individuals with the affluence
cues priming were made to feel less like that they were in resource-
rich environment. In addition, our results showed that the affect
did not shift as a result of poverty and affluence cues priming, so
participants were not made to feel poor or affluent. In
Experiment 2, because subjects were asked to focus their attention
on another feature (e.g., the number of people) rather than
poverty, so we think it is an implicit measure. This experimental
method has been shown to be reliably implicit manipulation in
previous studies [13,27].
In our experiment 3, each participant received ¥3 basic pay.
Then, we asked them to play a game [15], in which they were to
draw notes labeled ‘‘affluence’’ or ‘‘poverty.’’ The ‘‘affluence’’
(high-pay) participant received another ¥5 bonus to the basic pay
(the ‘‘affluence’’ state) and the ‘‘poverty’’ (low-pay) participant
received no bonus (the ‘‘poverty’’ state). In results, the ‘‘poor’’ have
¥3, and the ‘‘rich’’ have ¥8. Thus, it seems more likely that this is
a manipulation of relative poor versus rich, not a manipulation of
relative loss versus gain, since loss is considered that participants
are taken away from what they have had. This is also in line with
previous study which showed that the high-pay participant was
considered as the ‘‘rich’’, and that the low-pay participant was
considered as the ‘‘poor’’ [15]. In addition, our findings in
Experiment 3 showed that affect did not shift as a result of
receiving or not receiving a monetary bonus. We think there are
two reasons: on the one hand, each participant first received ¥3
basic pay. On the other hand, after the intertemporal task,
participant has another chance to get other bonus from their
performance. So the two reasons make participants’ affect
unchanged.
Alternative Interpretations
Proponents of evolutionary approaches to human behavior
argue that evolutionary analyses can help us understand why
humans act as they do because natural selection has shaped the
structure of the mental mechanisms that govern human action.
Several recent studies have also reported SES disparities in
Prefrontal/Executive function. For example, Lipina (2005)
reported that infants from lower SES families were, on average,
less advanced in the inhibitory control abilities [28]. Studies of
adults with neuropsychological tests converge on the same
conclusion, showing SES disparities in tests of executive function
[29]. The long developmental trajectory of prefrontal regions
might be expected to render them particularly susceptible to
environmental influence [30]. And, in some situations, preferring
small present gains over large future ones can be rational due to
adaptations to reproductive success and life history trade-offs.
According to this perspective of evolution, decision mechanisms
should fit the environment in which they operate–temporal
preferences should be ‘ecologically rational’ rather than econom-
ically rational [31]. Thus, the poor should discount the future
more steeply than the rich in order to adapt to present survival.
By manipulating the relative poverty and affluence status of the
participants, our results showed that individuals in the poverty
cues preferred immediate gratification and those in the rich cues
tended to prefer delayed gratification. This is in line with previous
studies which indicated that real world decisions with significant
economic consequences could be influenced by subtle context
features [12]. Furthermore, our findings emphasize that it is
a change of the poverty-affluence status, not a trait change, can
influence individuals’ preference in intertemporal choice. Howev-
Poverty Cues and Immediate Gratification
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status in the future may lead to a difference of brain’s function.
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